Alice is a private citizen whose computational resources are modest. Bob represents a large organisation at the forefront of computational and cryptological research. Bob's computational and cryptanalytic power is unknown to Alice, but Bob can confidently estimate a bound on Alice's ability to carry out a computation that would break a classical bit commitment of his. Alice wishes to commit a bit to Bob. She requires that he will never be able to decode it unless she chooses to reveal it, but also that if she does he will be confident that her commitment was genuine. We describe here a simple quantum bit commitment scheme which satisfies these criteria.
Introduction
Quantum information, unlike classical information, can be used to send messages between two previously isolated parties, encrypted in a way that is believed to be unconditionally secure -that is, the probability of successfully eavesdropping, by employing any technology that respects the known laws of physics, can be made arbitrarily small. [1, 2] Protocols have been proposed for carrying out several other cryptographic tasks by quantum means, but none to date has been shown to be unconditionally secure.
The case of quantum bit commitment is particularly interesting. In classical bit commitment protocols, one party, Alice, supplies an encoded bit to another, Bob. Alice tries to ensure that Bob cannot decode the bit until she reveals further information, while convincing Bob that she was genuinely committed all along. That is, Bob must be convinced that the protocol does not allow two different decodings of the bit which leave Alice free to reveal either 0 or 1, as she wishes. All classical bit commitment schemes are in principle insecure, though very good practical security can be attained. Several quantum bit commitment schemes have been proposed.[e.g.2,3,4,5] The BCJL scheme [3] was claimed, and for a time believed, to be unconditionally secure: it was thought that it could be demonstrated that, if quantum theory is universally valid, then the probabilities of Alice successfully cheating and of Bob decoding the bit can both be made arbitrarily small.
The insecurity of the BCJL scheme was first demonstrated by Mayers. [6, 7, 8] That a large class of quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure was shown independently by Lo and Chau, [9, 10] and Mayers. [7, 8, 11] As Mayers showed, [7, 8] the intuition underlying these proofs extends to a more general class of schemes, including BCJL, in which the information available to Bob about the encoded bit is small but non-zero. From these results, Mayers [7] and Lo and Chau [10] conclude that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible.
This has led to considerable gloom over the potential for new "post Cold War" applications of quantum cryptography, involving the transfer or trading of information between two or more parties who wish to retain more privacy than classical cryptography can guarantee. Lo and Chau, for instance, take their arguments as a strong indication that, despite widespread early optimism, realistic post Cold War applications of quantum cryptography simply do not exist. [10] Several reasons are given. Bit commitment is a relatively simple cryptographic task, and some more interesting tasks, such as oblivious transfer, all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets, and certain types of multi-party computation, are known to be stronger, in the sense that they can also be used to perform bit commitment. Bit commitment also tends, in classical cryptography, to be used as a building block for more complicated protocols: it may be hard to carry out many interesting tasks without bit commitment, even if they are not (or are not known to be) stronger in the above sense. [12] And Lo has extended the earlier proofs, arguing that unconditional security is impossible for all one-sided two-party computations and for many two-sided two-party computations. [13] Mayers' and Lo and Chau's results are of great intellectual interest and (potentially) practical importance. However, the general pessimism over post Cold War quantum cryptography seems overstated.
To develop the pessimistic case a little, suppose -for the sake of discussion -that no interesting quantum cryptographic tasks aside from key distribution can be implemented with unconditional security. There is then, admittedly, an apocalyptic view of the future of cryptography in general, which runs as follows. Once quantum computers are built, all classical cryptographic schemes will become insecure. When NP tasks such as factorisation become P, the balance of power will shift decisively from cryptographers to cryptanalysts: Shor's factorisation algorithm [14] and variants will mean that any classical code is breakable. Since quantum computers would also make quantum bit commitment and other quantum cryptographic protocols breakable, cryptographers will not be able to regain their advantage by turning to quantum information.
But there are clear counterarguments. First, many quantum cryptographic protocols are believed to be secure at present. The only known attack on the BCJL protocol, for example, relies on Alice possessing a quantum computer. 1 The only strong arguments against implementing post Cold War quantum cryptography at the moment rely on the questionable assumption that the era of quantum computing may begin at any time.
Second, even assuming that powerful quantum computers can be built in the foreseeable future, there is no reason to believe their power will be effectively unlimited. Present estimates [15, 16] of the speed at which factorisation could be carried out on a quantum computer may well be superseded, but they do give pause for thought. Any seriously powerful quantum computer would certainly make all existing quantum bit commitment schemes insecure. But it might still be a very long time before quantum factorisation methods prove faster than the known classical methods for large numbers. 2 It might be some while longer still, to put it mildly, before there seems the slightest risk that products of pairs of large primes can generally be factored essentially as fast as they can be generated. In the meantime -which is to say, unless and until technology advances beyond anything presently envisaged -a cryptographic scheme which relies on temporary uncomputability can be on pretty firm ground. There are no no-go theorems bounding what can be achieved by combining quantum cryptography with a temporary uncomputability assumption.
In fact, to the best of my knowledge, the possibility of combining temporary uncomputability assumptions with quantum cryptography has only briefly been considered, in a short review by Crépeau. [17] Crépeau examines the possibility of improving a quantum bit commitment protocol by a combination of classical bit commitments and temporary computability bounds, and concludes that nothing is gained. If a classical bit commitment is used by Bob to check Alice's honesty in a standard quantum bit commitment protocol, the protocol becomes as insecure as the classical protocol, over which it has no advantage. And if Alice is required to make complicated classical bit commitments, constrained by bounds on her own computing power, she can still cheat, given a quantum computer, provided that she has enough computing power to carry out the protocol at all.
These conclusions seem right, provided that the protocol involves Alice sending quantum information to Bob, as in a standard quantum bit commitment protocol. However, there is no reason for the flow of quantum information to be only one-way. We describe here a new quantum bit commitment protocol in which all the relevant quantum information begins (and ends) with Bob. Taken alone, this protocol is vulnerable to cheating by a Mayers-Lo-Chau attack. If Bob can use a quantum computer, he can deviate from the protocol undetectably in a way that allows him to read Alice's bit before revelation.
We thus describe a way of supplementing the protocol by classical bit commitments sent from Bob to Alice. These classical bit commitments guarantee to Alice that Bob is following the protocol honestly and will not be able to read her bit. But, unless and until she can break them independently (without asking Bob to unveil them), they give her no advantage. If she breaks them before revelation, she can cheat; if not, any attempt of hers to cheat will almost certainly be detected.
This is a significant advantage, provided that the time between commitment and revelation is fixed and relatively short. It must be fixed, so that Bob can be confident that, even with fixed and limited computing power, Alice will not eventually be able to cheat; it must be relatively short, so that he can be confident her computing power will not dramatically increase before unveiling. As short-term bit commitments are often needed, for their own sake or as components of larger cryptographic routines, this version of the protocol may already prove quite useful.
The protocol can be made more secure by bootstrapping itself. In a first iteration, the original protocol replaces the classical bit commitment, and allows Bob to commit bits securely to Alice. The commitment is now indefinitely secure against attack by either party, provided only that Alice cannot break the original classical bit commitments within a fixed time interval. In a second iteration, the first iteration replaces the classical bit commitment, allowing Alice to commit bits to Bob. Again, the commitment is now indefinitely secure, provided that the original classical commitments were temporarily secure.
Quantum bit commitment
We first describe a quantum bit commitment protocol on which the remaining protocols are based. Note that in principle this protocol alone is insecure. [7, 9] The protocol works by the exchange of qubits -quantum states in a two dimensional Hilbert space. Alice and Bob agree in advance to represent qubits by the physical properties of some particle -photon polarizations, or the spins of spin-1/2 nuclei, say. They agree on some basis |0 , |1 , and define the rotation
The protocol runs as follows. Bob stipulates a number N B . He sends Alice N B states, labelled in sequence as |ψ
A i
for i from 1 to N B , each of which is chosen randomly and independently from the set |0 , U |0 , U 2 |0 , U 3 |0 .
Alice then carries out one of two alternative procedures, depending on whether she wants to commit a 0 or 1. To commit a 0, she selects independent random unitary maps, chosen from the two operations 1 and U 2 , each with probability 1/2. She then performs one of these randomly chosen operations on each of the states supplied by Bob. 
Enhanced security via classical bit commitment
In the enhanced version of the protocol, Alice stipulates a number N A >> N B . Bob now sends Alice N A particles, chosen randomly as before. He also sends N A encoded classical commitments of a pair of bits. When decoded, these commitments describe the state of each of the particles according to some previously agreed cipher: 00, 01, 10, 11 correspond respectively to |0 , U |0 , U 2 |0 , U 3 |0 , let us say.
Bob has encoded these bits in such a way that (i) Alice is certain that he cannot cheat in revealing them, and (ii) he is confident that she cannot decode them in the time between her commitment and unveiling. For definiteness -though there are probably better methods -let us suppose that for each bit he sends a product N = p 1 p 2 of two large primes, with N ≡ 2 (mod 3). Writing p 1 > p 2 , this encodes 0 if p 1 ≡ 1 (mod 3) and 1 if p 1 ≡ 2 (mod 3): to decode the bit, Bob must reveal p 1 and p 2 to Alice, who can then easily check that p 1 p 2 = N and (we assume) that p 1 and p 2 are indeed prime.
Alice now chooses any (N A − N B ) of the particles, and asks Bob to reveal his classical commitments for those particles. She checks that the quantum state of each particle agrees with the classical commitment, either by carrying out the appropriate measurement, if her technology has allowed her to store the particles, or by comparing the commitments against measurements previously carried out in randomly chosen bases.
If the states pass these checks, Alice accepts that Bob is following the protocol honestly, or at least that any deviations are sufficiently small and sufficiently infrequent to allow him to extract negligible information about the bit she will commit. She then proceeds to the commitment phase of the protocol, using the remaining N B particles to commit a single bit, as before.
If the checks fail, Alice concludes either that Bob is cheating or that there is noise on the channel. She then abandons the protocol, having revealed nothing to Bob.
Proof of security of the enhanced protocol
Consider first Bob's cheating possibilities. If Bob supplies pure states to Alice according to the protocol, he cannot tell whether the states returned to him commit a zero or a one: from his perspective, either commitment leaves him with the same mixed state
Bob could read Alice's commitments if he were to deviate from the protocol, either by sending pure states other than U n |0 or by sending states entangled with a subsystem that remains under his control. But if he does so, he cannot avoid the risk that his cheating will be detected: if any of the (N A − N B ) particles Alice selects is not in the correct pure state, there is some probability that her measurements will reveal the fact.
To be more precise, say that Bob cheats with frequency δ(ǫ) and deviation ǫ if a proportion δ(ǫ) of the states he returns differs from the classically declared state by more than ǫ, in the sense that the overlap between the states ρ of the particle returned to Alice -which may be mixed through entanglement -and the declared state |ψ D obeys
For any positive ǫ, δ and δ ′ that Alice chooses, she can choose N A sufficiently large that she will detect with probability (1 − δ ′ ) if Bob cheats with frequency ≥ δ(ǫ) and deviation ≥ ǫ. If Alice detects cheating, she stops the protocol at this point, having revealed nothing to Bob. If not, she can proceed secure in the knowledge that Bob's cheating is almost certainly limited by δ(ǫ) and ǫ. If Bob follows the protocol faithfully, Alice's random rotations ensure that he has no way of distinguishing between the commitment of a zero or a one. If Bob cheats, the information available to him depends continuously on the degree to which his returned states deviate from the protocol. It follows that Alice can choose δ(ǫ) and ǫ so as to make the exploitable information potentially available to Bob in the later stages as close to zero as she wishes. Bob has no further resource: there is nothing he will ever be able to do to decode Alice's commitment.
Suppose now that Bob follows his measurement protocol faithfully, but that Alice wishes to cheat by supplying states to Bob which allow her the choice of declaring either a zero or a one at the revelation stage. Unless she can decode the classical bit commitments, she has no information a priori as to which of the states |0 , U |0 , U 2 |0 , U 3 |0 describes any
given particle supplied to her. Her most general option is to arrange a unitary evolution so that an input state α|0 + β|1 will evolve to an output state of the form
Here the first state in the products describes a sub-system, which we may assume remains under Alice's control: if it does not, her cheating potential can only be diminished. The second state in the products describes the particle which she returns to Bob. Unitarity implies that the two bracketed states must be normalised and orthogonal: the individual |τ ab are not normalised and need not in general all be linearly independent or non-zero.
For Alice later to be able to reveal a one, in a way which will convince Bob, she must be able to carry out a measurement on the |τ states which reproduces both the statistics of a measurement of the originally supplied state in the |0 , |1 basis and the correct rotations. For this to be possible, the states {|τ 00 , |τ 01 , |τ 10 , |τ 11 } must all be orthogonal, though they need not all be non-zero.
To be able to reveal a zero, she must either be able to declare a rotation without any further action, or else she must be able to carry out a measurement on the |τ states whose two possible outcomes allow her to declare rotations I and U 2 respectively. The evolution (3) means that the possible input states evolve as follows:
(|τ 00 − |τ 10 − |τ 01 + |τ 11 )
To be able to declare a zero, Alice thus requires that the spaces spanned by |τ 00 , |τ 11 , |τ 00 + |τ 10 + |τ 01 + |τ 11 , |τ 00 − |τ 10 − |τ 01 + |τ 11 (5) and by |τ 01 , |τ 10 , |τ 00 + |τ 10 − |τ 01 − |τ 11 , |τ 00 − |τ 10 + |τ 01 − |τ 11 (6) are orthogonal. This implies that |τ 10 = −|τ 01 and that |τ 00 = |τ 11 , which is inconsistent with Alice being able to declare a one.
Since the detection probability depends continuously on the inner product matrix of the |τ ab , and since the space of possible matrices is compact, there is a non-zero lower bound p 0 on the probability of Alice's cheating being detected for any given state. By choosing N B sufficiently large, Bob can thus ensure that the overall probability of his detecting cheating is as close to one as he wishes. If he measures both states returned to him, in random bases, before the revelation, he can still ensure this by comparing his measurement statistics against Alice's claims. The protocol is thus secure against Alice's cheating, so long as Bob's classical bit commitments are secure.
Note, though, that if Alice believes she will be able to break Bob's classical commitments by the time of revelation, and if she is able to store and manipulate quantum states, she can prepare a state of the form (3) , with all the |τ ab orthogonal and of square norm 1 2 , and carry out measurements projecting onto the appropriate linear combinations once she has worked out which state Bob sent and decided which bit she wants to commit. Of course, if in the event she fails to break the classical commitments in time, her cheating attempt will almost certainly be detected. Still, Bob risks being deceived if he seriously underestimates Alice's computational power.
If the commitment is short-term, and unless there are truly revolutionary developments in classical cryptanalysis, this is probably a negligible risk for a crytographically literate Bob. But if the commitment is meant to last for some time -years, say, rather than minutes -the risk could be significant. And if the commitment is meant to be indefinite, the risk is large: any classical bit commitment presently possible will probably eventually be breakable. A stronger constraint on Alice would clearly be preferable for long-term commitments. It would also be desirable if Alice were able to trust quantum bit commitments made by Bob, despite her being unable to bound his computational and cryptanalytic power with any confidence. The next section explains how to achieve these desiderata.
Iterating the protocol
The protocol just described requires Bob to guarantee his honesty via classical bit commitments. Alice cannot confidently reciprocate when she wishes to receive a secure bit commitment from Bob, since she is uncertain how easily Bob can break any classical bit commitment code. But instead she can use an iterated version of the protocol.
In the first iterated version, Alice and Bob swap places. Alice now sends random pure states, chosen from |0 , U |0 , U 2 |0 , U 3 |0 to Bob. But now Alice uses the quantum bit commitment protocol just described, instead of a classical bit commitment, to commit to Bob a description of each of the states she sends and so to guarantee her honesty. Bob tests state by state whether Alice's bit committed descriptions agree with the states, until he is satisfied with her honesty. If he is, he proceeds to the bit commitment stage of the protocol as above.
Besides allowing Bob and Alice to swap roles, this version of the protocol has the feature that it is secure unless Alice can break Bob's classical bit commitments during the honesty testing stage of the protocol. Once this phase of the protocol is over, Alice gains nothing from breaking the classical commitments. At this point, she has already been forced to send Bob random pure states, and can extract no information from the bit Bob has committed on them. On the other hand Bob cannot cheat, no matter how great his computational power, since he cannot break the original quantum bit commitment protocol.
In a second iteration, Alice and Bob return to their original roles in the quantum bit commitment protocol. Bob now uses the first iteration of the protocol in place of the classical bit commitments. Since Alice cannot break this protocol unless she can break the classical commitments embedded within it during the honesty testing, she again cannot cheat once that phase is over.
Taken together, these last two protocols define a way for Alice and Bob to commit bits to each other, with security conditional only on the hypothesis that Alice cannot break Bob's classical bit commitments within a fixed time interval at the start of the protocol.
Comments
We have seen that, by using quantum information, permanent two-sided security in bit commitment can be obtained from temporary one-sided computational bounds. The schemes presented are relatively simple and perfectly practical with present technology.
